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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Wally Kay Schultz appeals from the summary dismissal of his successive
petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In separate underlying criminal cases, a jury convicted Schultz of felony
domestic battery and he pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance. (R.,
p. 135.) The matters proceeded to joint sentencing and the district court retained
jurisdiction. (Id.) On May 22, 2006 the district court entered an order placing
Schultz on probation. (Id.) Three days later it entered an order setting the terms
and conditions of probation. (Id.)
Schultz's trial counsel filed a notice of appeal timely only from the second
order. (R., p. 136.) The Idaho Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed this appeal
as untimely. (Id.) The appellate court issued its remittitur on August 27, 2009.
(Id.)
While the appeal of the underlying criminal cases was pending, Schultz
filed petitions for post-conviction relief related to both cases on January 13, 2009,
and March 24, 2009, respectively.

(R., p. 136.)

He did not allege claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely appeal in either case,
although he did unsuccessfully attempt to amend the petition to allege such a
claim in one of them.

(Id.) The district court appointed counsel to represent

Schultz in both post-conviction cases. (Id.) The district court granted the state's
motion to summarily dismiss the petitions on January 8, 2010. (R., p. 137.) The
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Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on appeal on May 9, 2011, holding
that the petitions were untimely because the untimely appeals in the criminal
cases did not extend the time to file the post-conviction petitions.

Schultz v.

State, 151 Idaho 383, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011).
On January 21, 2011, Schultz initiated the current case by filing a
successive petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p. 1.) In the petition Schultz
asserted claims that his post-conviction counsel had been ineffective by failing to
secure affidavits and make arguments that, he asserted, would have led to
application of a "[d]iscovery exception" and prevented the dismissal of his initial
petitions for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp. 1-3. 1 )

The relief he ultimately

requested was to be "allowed to re-file his original Post-conviction Cases and
argue against the State's Motion to Dismiss." (R., p. 99.)
The state moved to dismiss the petition. (R., pp. 106-15.) In the motion
the state argued that Schultz failed to show ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel because Schultz failed to establish that post-conviction
counsel could have prevented the dismissal of the petitions.

(R., p. 113.)

Schultz responded, contending that post conviction counsel failed to discover
evidence that counsel in his criminal case and appeal advised Schultz that his
time for filing the initial petitions was not running, which information would have
led to his initial petitions not being dismissed as untimely. (R., pp. 119-28.)

1

Schultz was later allowed to amend his petition to assert a claim of newly
discovered evidence regarding the state crime lab. (R., pp. 58-60, 76, 91-92, 95104.) Because Schultz does not challenge the dismissal of this claim on appeal
(Appellant's brief, p. 3), it is not further addressed in this brief.
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The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal, but on
a ground other than asserted by the state. (R., pp. 135-45.) Specifically the
district court held that because Schultz asserted only a claim of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel, and no claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, Schultz failed to set forth a viable claim for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp. 139-41.) Schultz filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 147, 149-50.)
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ISSUE
Schultz states the issue on appeal as:
Should the order summarily dismissing the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim be reversed because the district court
dismissed on grounds not stated in the state's motion for summary
dismissal without giving a 20-day notice and allowing Mr. Schultz to
respond?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Schultz failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his
successive petition for post-conviction relief?

4

ARGUMENT
Schultz Has Failed To Show That Dismissal Of His Successive Petition Was
Improper

A

This Court Should Affirm On The Grounds Asserted In The State's Motion
For Summary Dismissal
When the state files a motion for summary dismissal, setting forth

adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal, and the court grants the state's
motion for the reasons urged by the state, a post-conviction petitioner receives
adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,
159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). The district court cannot, however,
"dismiss a claim on a ground not asserted by the state in its motion unless the
court gives the twenty-day notice required by Section 19-4906(b)." DeRushe v.
State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (citing Saykhamchone v.
State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)). The purpose of the 20day notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give the petitioner the
opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to establish a genuine
issue of material fact.

Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073,

1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678
(1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. App.
1995).
Schultz correctly argues that the state moved to dismiss because Schultz
failed to establish ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, but the
district court dismissed for failure to state any claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Schultz therefore lacked notice of the grounds ultimately applied by
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the district court for dismissal. Where the grounds for dismissal articulated by the
district court are erroneous, however, the appellate court "must consider ... any
alternative ground" set forth in the summary judgment motion and "affirm the
district court if ... summary judgment on this cause of action would have been
proper on an alternative basis that was presented below." Johnson v. McPhee,
147 Idaho 455, 466, 210 P.3d 563, 574 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Schultz v.
State, 153 Idaho 791, _ , 291 P.3d 474, 480 (Ct. App. 2012) (affirming on
ground different than trial court, but raised in state's motion to dismiss). Because
the state's motion is meritorious, the district court's dismissal should be affirmed
on that basis.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).
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C.

Schultz Failed To Set Forth A Prima Facie Claim That His Initial Petitions
Were Dismissed Because Of The Ineffective Assistance Of PostConviction Counsel
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be

commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later."

In the

case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims
which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise
important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d
870, 874 (2007)). Because I.C. § 19-4908 contemplates successive petitions to
assert a claim that "for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately
raised," claims that "raise important due process issues" that were "not known to
the defendant" within the one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902(a) can be
brought within a reasonable time of their discovery. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 25051, 220 P.3d at 1069-70. Absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation
period should be tolled, the failure to timely file a petition for post-conviction relief
- either within the one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902 or within a
reasonable time of the discovery of new claims - is a basis for dismissal of the
petition.

Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v. State, 136

Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d
1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009).
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In this case the statute of limitations for filing for post-conviction relief ran
one year and 42 days from May 22, 2006. See Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,
256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011) (untimely appeal did not extend time to file for postconviction). Thus, Schultz should have filed his initial petition on or before July 3,
2007. Schultz filed his initial petitions on January 13, 2009 and March 24, 2009,
respectively. (R., p. 136.) These petitions were dismissed as untimely brought.
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011).

Schultz,

therefore, had the burden of establishing that ineffective assistance of his
appellate counsel in defending against the statute of limitation defense was the
reason his claims were dismissed as untimely. See I.C. § 19-4908; Charboneau
v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). He failed to carry that
burden.
Initially, it is clear that post-conviction counsel appointed after the filing of
the petitions was not responsible for the timing of the filing. Schultz's claim was
that post-conviction counsel should have responded to the state's motion to
dismiss the untimely petitions with affidavits or other evidence from the trial and
appellate attorneys in the criminal case and by making certain legal arguments.
(R., pp. 97-98.)

The information Schultz believes his original post-conviction

attorney should have presented included a letter from the bar association (R., p.
97; see also R., pp. 5-9) and an affidavit from the appellate lawyer in the criminal
case (R., p. 97; see also R., pp. 10-23). The argument counsel should have
made, according to Schultz, was that trial counsel had a duty to file a timely
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appeal and that Schultz was misled by the belief that a timely appeal had been
filed. (R., pp. 97-98; see also R., pp. 24-26.)
Schultz has failed to make a prima facie showing that his post-conviction
counsel could have avoided the summary dismissal of his petitions. The Idaho
Court of Appeals characterized Schultz's arguments against dismissal of the
initial post-conviction petitions as follows:
Schultz argues that the district court erred in determining
that his post-conviction petitions are barred by the statute of
limitation because Schultz received ineffective assistance of
counsel when his counsel failed to file timely direct appeals, and
because Schultz did not discover this untimely filing until, at the
earliest, the State's response on direct appeal.
These
circumstances, Schultz argues, tolled the statute of limitation in his
cases. He asserts that when appeals were taken in his two criminal
cases, he had no way of knowing that this Court would ultimately
conclude that the notices of appeal were invalid because they were
filed three days late. Schultz maintains that because he had a
good faith belief that his appeals were timely, absent tolling of the
statute of limitation he will be deprived of a reasonable opportunity
to present his claims, and therefore will be deprived of due process.
Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794. Applying existing Idaho authority,
the Court of Appeals concluded "the statute of limitation on Schultz's properly
pied post-conviction claims was not tolled," because the invalid appeal did not
extend the time to file and Schultz "knew of the underlying facts giving rise to his
claims." Id at 387, 256 P.3d at 795. 2

The Idaho Court of Appeals did not address whether tolling might have been
applicable to a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the
notice of appeal, because such claim had not been pied. Schultz, 151 Idaho at
387, 256 P.3d at 795. Schultz did not assert a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel in his successive petition, and in fact requested as relief the
reinstatement of the prior petitions that did not include any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely appeal. (R., p. 99 (requesting
reinstatement of prior petitions in prayer for relief).)
2
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Schultz failed to present a prima facie claim that post-conviction counsel
could have prevented the dismissal of his untimely petitions.

There was no

tolling because the untimely notices of appeal did not toll the period to file and
because Schultz was aware of the underlying facts supporting his claims.
Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386-87, 256 P.3d at 794-95.

Schultz presented no

evidence that the notices of appeal were in fact timely filed, or that he was
unaware of the underlying facts. His argument that he was "advised by counsel
that his timeline for post-conviction was not running" (R., p. 122) fails because it
was 2009 when he was first told he could file his post-conviction petition after his
appeal (R., p. 13), well after the limitation period had run, and he in fact filed his
petition (R., p. 136 (petition filed January 13, 2009)) before his appellate attorney
advised him that his appeal might not be timely (R., pp. 18-19 (advising him of
timeliness problem in February 11, 2009 letter)). The Court of Appeals already
rejected his claim that his "mistaken belief that the law allowed him more time to
file" tolled the limitation period.

Schultz, 151 Idaho at 387, 256 P.3d at 795.

Schultz did not present any claims or evidence that would call that holding into
doubt.
In this case the district court dismissed on a ground not asserted in the
state's motion.

However, the court's order may still be affirmed because the

court could have granted the state's motion on the ground asserted. Because
Schultz failed to show that his post-conviction counsel's handling of the statute of
limitation issue had anything to do with the ultimate dismissal of the postconviction petitions as untimely, he failed to establish any basis for reinstating
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those petitions.

He has therefore failed to show any error in the summary

dismissal of his successive petition.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
summarily dismissing Schultz's successive petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 11th day of March, 2013.

KENNETH K. JORGEN
Deputy Attorney General
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